Abstract
Introduction
On the financial markets it is of primary importance to understand what makes interest rates vary during a trading day. Insofar as interest rates are very heavily dependent on economic fundamentals, it is particularly important to analyse how the arrival of new information about these fundamentals is incorporated into prices. One way to detect which data are considered the most important for the markets is to measure the short term impact of announcements through their surprise effect.
The impact of news about the economy and monetary policy has already been very closely studied in the US (Ederington and Lee (1993), Fleming and Remolona (1997), Balduzzi and al. (2001) , Piazzesi (2005) to name a few). In Europe however, given the ECB's relative youth and the shallow historic depth of the European data available to date, these studies remain few and relatively recent (Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2002) , Goldberg and Leonard (2003) , Andersson and al. (2006) ). These papers highlight the fact that the European market's peculiar feature is that it is subject to complex influences: it is impacted not only by European but also American news, by national economic figures and the ECB's aggregated statistics.
As a result, one key difficulty in Europe arises from the fact that it is absolutely crucial to bear in mind the influence of US interest rates on European ones. According to Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2002) , Goldberg and Leonard (2003) , this influence can be due to several factors: (1) the integration of financial markets and contagion effects; (2) the real macroeconomic integration of the 2 zones; (3) the common perception among markets that the US is the engine of world growth; and (4) the status of "advanced indicators" enjoyed by US figures compared with their European equivalents.
The methodology used by the above authors to take into account the American influence is to include both European and American economic announcements in the regression used to explain European interest rates. Although this methodology is a relatively simple way to take account of American influence, it has the drawback of ignoring part of the information. Notably, the US yield curve changes even in the absence of any economic announcements in the US 1 , and these changes in the American curve certainly exert an influence on European rates. This omission of some information is harmful and, as we will see below, can create biases in estimating the impact of economic announcements in Europe.
This suggests that it would be a useful improvement to show the influence of the entire American yield curve on European rates, and not merely of announcements in the US alone. Bernanke and Boivin (2003) demonstrated that in a "data-rich" economic environment, it is optimal to take account of a maximum of available information, rather than concentrate on a small number of variables, even those chosen to be the most relevant. They propose to use Stock and Watson (2002) method of dimension reduction schemes akin to traditional principal component analysis as a way to extract key information from large databases.
Our approach in this paper is analogous, though we apply it to a different type of problem. The influence of American interest rates on the European curve passes through multiple channels and cannot be modelled on a simple basis. One prerequisite is therefore to manage to synthesise all the information coming from day-to-day changes in the American yield curve, using a restricted number of factors that can subsequently be incorporated into our regression on each maturity of European interest rates.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it proposes an original methodology that makes it possible to separate, within day-to-day changes in European rates, the impact due to European economic announcements from the influence of 
Data and methodology
This section presents the methodology used in this paper as well as the associated dataset. We first discuss the motivations for our methodology. Then we present the model chosen to capture the euro bond market reaction to macroeconomic news. Finally, we detail the dataset used to estimate the model.
Announcements and surprises in a data-rich environment
Several US macroeconomic announcements are known to impact the euro yield curve (see Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2002) (Brière (2006) ). Thus, the real number of US economic news items to be considered when disentangling US influence from euro rates can be too large to be taken properly into account. To a great extent, US rates can be understood as a summary of the news that is important to the market. Nonetheless, the US yield curve is made of a large number of maturities: choosing those that best account for US yield curve movements can be tricky. Thus, we are confronted with a "data-rich" environment: the number of possible explanatory variables can be larger than the number of observations itself, given the length of the euro rate dataset.
Situations of this kind can be treated with factor-based methods, such as Principal 
General Methodology
In this paper, we propose to estimate a Then, we define the surprise in the figure j at time t as:
where j σ is defined as the standard error of the economic surprises ie
This scaling procedure will enable us to compare the results between surprises. We then use these surprises to explain the variation of rates over one day for a given maturity. 
Let C be the correlation matrix associated with the series in US R ∆ . Given that C meets the standard conditions for the Spectral Theorem to apply, it can be decomposed as:
the ordered eigenvalues matrix, when C has rank p , and D is the matrix whose columns contains the associated eigenvectors. We recall that the PCA factors are composed as : With these settings in mind, the model specified in equation (2) can be augmented the following way :
with the previous hypothesis still applying.
We nonetheless allow the
process to be heteroscedastic. The interest rate datasets usually display a form of autoregressive variance, as was found in Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2002) for a case close to our. We thus allow
to follow a GARCH (1,1) process. We do not document this point, but this model suffices to account for heteroscedasticity in the dataset presented in the next section. Finally, our model can be consistently estimated by Generalized Least Squares, thus taking into account non spherical innovations.
Data
The US rate dataset contains daily swap rates with maturities ranging from 1 to 30 years used to compute the PCA factors. It is standard to use swap rates datasets in such a study, when the sampling frequency is daily (Guégan and Ielpo (2007) ). Our sample period covers the period 2 January 2000 -30 July 2007, including each business day. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the daily changes in US swap rates, for selected maturities. The euro swap rate dataset is constructed in the same way, including daily swap rates for the same maturities. To these rates, we add cash Euribor rates for maturities of 3 months, 6 months and 9 months to take into account the very short end of the yield curve. Table 2 presents summary statistics for selected maturities of the daily changes in euro rates. 
Results

European figures impacting fixed-income markets
For each of the 16 interest-rate maturities, we carried out the regressions presented in the previous section. Table 5 recapitulates the impact of our 18 economic announcements on 3 key maturities in the yield curve: 2, 5 and 10 rates, with and without introducing the 3
American factors to these regression analyses. Our first observation is that the introduction of the 3 first factors into the American yield curve in the regression changes the impact of European announcements, a sign that the omission of these variables generates a true bias. It also reduces the standard error of our coefficients 2 . This is the case for the European CPI, whose impact diminishes when we introduce the American factors: it becomes non significant for most of the maturities. For the M3 money supply figure, the difference is even more striking, since the coefficient goes from being non significant (and negative) without counting the American influence to significant when this influence is factored in. We note that the amplitude of the impact is twice as great for the ZEW when the American influence is factored in. 2006)). In our study, however, we note a much more significant influence of German retail sales. This may be due to the fact that the period we study is slightly more recent, when the weakness of German domestic demand was a genuine market worry. We also find little influence of the job indicators, as noted by Andersson and al. (2006) , mainly due to the markets' prior knowledge of German pre-scheduled releases.
Among the national economic figures, the German ones had the greatest impact (the sole exception in this connection being the French consumer confidence figure) . These statistics played a much greater role than the aggregated European statistics, for two main reasons: first, the German economy's very important role within the European Union in the eyes of the markets; and second, the fact that the aggregated European statistics are always published later than national statistics, adding only a small amount of additional information when they come out.
The main difference between our results and existing studies has to do with the price indicators. Previous studies highlighted the markets' weak reaction to announcements of the M3 money supply, though this is one of the ECB's pillars. Our results are different, showing that taking greater account of the American influence on the yield curve changes this result. It highlights a real impact of the M3 money supply on rates, a much more important one than that of the inflation indicators themselves. This result is in line with the importance of this indicator for the ECB, stressed in most central bankers' speeches, and the testimony of investors on this subject. The weak influence of inflation figures, even if the CPI is one of the explicit targets of the ECB, is not a surprise, given the fact that Euro inflation is pretty well anticipated by economists and markets, who know prior releases of German and Italian data. Table 6 classifies the figures which have a significant impact on rates for 8 maturities in the curve (selected as the most representative and the most watched among the 16 included in our study). We note the significant figures at or above the 5% and 10% thresholds. It is worth noting that the determining factors are slightly different for the short and long end of the curve. For virtually all maturities from the 5 year rate, the 4 most important indicators for the markets are Germany's IFO, ZEW, its retail sales and manufacturing orders.
A set of different, much more significant figures appear for short term rates (less than 5 years), namely the money supply, target rate announcements and European GDP. 
Distortion of the yield curve by announcements
For each figure which exerts a significant impact on European interest rates the above In contrast, for price indicators (inflation, M3), the impact grows very steeply between 3 months and 1 years; it is then relatively flat regardless of the maturity, suggesting that the figures influence inflation expectations not only in the short term, but in the long term as well.
The M3 indicator exerts its strongest influence on 2 year rates, whereas that of European inflation is around 5 year rates.
Announcements of target rates have the particular feature of influencing yields only in the very short term: their impact is significant only on 3 month rates, and this reaction's shape slopes downwards with rate maturities, becoming negative (though weakly significant)
starting from 7 year rates. All in all, a target rate increase will lead to a flatter yield curve. It is very striking to analyse this impact, which underpins the idea that the long end of the curve's reaction to news about monetary policy depends considerably on the markets' view of how credibly the monetary authorities are fighting inflation. In an environment where the authorities enjoy credibility, currently the case in Europe, a rise in target rates can push down long rates provided the markets anticipate that the effects of this decision will be to lower anticipations of long term inflation. This is the well known "paradox" in monetary policy announcements highlighted by Carlstrom (1995) , which still holds true, since he demonstrated that a rise in short rates can lead to a fall in long rates, or at least in long rates which are relatively inert to changes in short rates.
Appendix 1 presents the 3 factors obtained on the American yield curve using PCA.
These are the 3 standard factors which account for distortions in the yield curve: parallel shift (factor 1), steepening (2) and changes in the curvature of the yield curve (3). Figure 2 below shows the regression coefficients for each of these factors. The "level" factor has the greatest impact on the curve, and this impact is quite stable for all maturities starting from 5 years yields. This means that US yield curve parallel shifts tend to drive similar reactions from the Euro yield curve, starting from intermediate maturities. The short end of the 2 curves, US and Euro, remain independent, and this is easily understandable considering the fact that they mostly react to their own monetary policy. The "slope" factor has a negative impact on the short end of the curve and a positive one on the long end. Lastly, the "curvature" factor's impact on the curve is virtually the opposite to that of the slope factor. reactions. This shape is highly revealing of market participants' anticipations of the monetary authorities' reactions to economic news. Participants tend to anticipate a reaction by the authorities in the medium term, assuming that a change in the economic environment will lead them to make a gradual cycle of rises or cuts in their target rates, which will not take effect immediately. We draw a more precise distinction between 2 different types of shapes depending on the type of indicator under study: economic sentiment or activity indicators on the one hand, and price indicators on the other.
Conclusion
One of the limits of this paper is to take an overall view of the period under study. In fact, the influence of economic news on the markets varies by cycle period (Guégan and Ielpo 
